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Can Antitrust Law Incorporate Insights from
Behavioral Economics?
Christopher R. Leslie*
In Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, Professor Tor builds on his
previous scholarship that explores how insights from behavioral economics
can be used to improve antitrust jurisprudence. The Chicago School of law
and economics revolutionized antitrust law. By applying insights from
microeconomics, scholars associated with the Chicago School introduced
more rigor into antitrust analysis. Antitrust law is now viewed through an
economics lens. Today, it is essentially impossible to practice antitrust law
without understanding several economic concepts.
The field of economics, however, has evolved in ways that undermine
the foundations of the Chicago School philosophy. Professor Tor explains
how behavioral economics has improved upon the basic microeconomic
models that have been so influential in antitrust jurisprudence over the past
few decades. The insights from behavioral economics challenge the policy
prescriptions associated with the Chicago School. The traditional form of
law and economics associated with the Chicago School argues that many
aspects of antitrust law are unnecessary because business decision makers are
rational and markets are self-correcting.1 According to this theory, firms do
not engage in costly anticompetitive conduct.2 Behavioral economics
identifies several ways in which individuals—and firms—deviate from socalled rationality. The lessons from behavioral economics demonstrate how

* Professor of Law, University of California Irvine School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,
925–28 (1979); Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1984).
2. Posner, supra note 1, at 925–28.
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antitrust enforcement can make markets more efficient than a strict laissezfaire approach.
Professor Tor’s article shows how behavioral economics represents a
refinement and improvement over traditional microeconomics. His article
does an excellent job of presenting several of the cognitive biases that form
the corpus of behavioral economics. Professor Tor also notes that when
asking antitrust agencies and courts to incorporate behavioral economics, we
should consider “the limits of these institutions.”3 This Response uses
Professor Tor’s cautionary note as its starting point by exploring the issue of
judicial resistance to incorporating the insights from behavioral economics
into antitrust jurisprudence.
This Response will proceed in three parts. Part One briefly reviews the
traditional law and economics approach to antitrust problems and how
behavioral economics can inform antitrust jurisprudence. Part Two expands
on Professor Tor’s observation that courts may resist behavioral antitrust and
explores the reasons why, the primary reason being the relative simplicity of
basic microeconomics compared to the more nuanced explanation of
business behavior offered by behavioral economics. Finally, Part Three
argues for less reliance on theory and greater appreciation of facts in antitrust
litigation.
I.

The Traditional Microeconomic Explanation of Markets and Antitrust

Law and economics theory is the dominant paradigm in antitrust
jurisprudence.4 Scholars associated with the Chicago School have been
largely successful in defining the goals and assumptions of antitrust analysis.
The goal of antitrust law, according to the law and economics paradigm, is
efficiency. The underlying assumption to their antitrust analysis is
rationality.5 Rationality in this context is defined as profit maximization.6
While necessary to make many economic models work, this rationality
assumption has distorted antitrust analysis and has led to incorrect results in
actual antitrust litigation.7

3. Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 573, 650 (2014).
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).
5. KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION
226 (2003) (describing rationality assumption as “an accurate description of firms”).
6. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (2000) (“Nearly
all law-and-economics literature on business organizations, following the neoclassical economic
theory of firms, is built on the explicit or implicit assumption that firms seek to maximize profits.”).
7. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261
(2010).
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The assumption of rationality affects antitrust doctrine because courts
assume that firms do not engage in irrational behavior.8 Courts use the
rationality assumption to argue that some forms of unilateral and
conspiratorial conduct are irrational and therefore must not have occurred. In
many cases, the theory of rationality employed by the court is inconsistent
with the actual facts of the case.9 This results in courts holding, as a matter
of law, the conduct alleged by the plaintiffs did not happen despite the fact
that the evidence in the case proves, as a matter of fact, the conduct did
happen.10
The problem with the rationality assumption is not that it never holds.
Most of the conduct engaged in by firms is easily understood as profit
maximizing. But litigation becomes complicated when firms engage in
conduct that seems to violate the assumption of rationality. Exposed to a
steady stream of traditional microeconomic theory, when some judges see a
perceived deviation from rationality, they reject it and conclude that this
nonconforming conduct must not be happening. This refusal to appreciate
the prevalence of so-called irrational behavior in modern economies can
distort fact-finding in individual cases.
Professor Tor’s article shows how behavioral economics explains many
deviations from rationality. Challenging the traditional law and economics
model’s assumption of rationality, behavioral law and economics shows that
people do not always behave rationally. Behavioral law and economics
seeks “to explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized) human
behavior for the law.”11 The new paradigm accepts, among other things, a
level of uncertainty in decision making.12 Through experiments, “behavioral
studies show that humans use fundamentally defective heuristics to simplify
choices made under conditions of uncertainty.”13 Invoking research from
other academic fields “such as psychology, neuroscience, and sociology,
behavioral economists note that a sizeable percentage of their test subjects
systemically deviate from these rational choice theories’ predicted outcome

8. See, e.g., Clark v. Flow Measurement, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 519, 526 (D.S.C. 1996) (“The only
way for a plaintiff to show willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power is to provide
evidence that the business accused…had an economically viable scheme in place. This stems from
the fact that there is a strong inference that rational businessmen would not engage in activities that
are economically senseless.” (citations omitted)).
9. See, e.g., id. at 523–26.
10. Leslie, supra note 7, at 285–318.
11. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1476 (1998).
12. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal
Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 503 (2002).
13. Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1729, 1732 (1998).
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in several important ways.”14 In particular, some studies show that corporate
decision making violates the rationality assumption.15 Professor Tor takes
these insights and applies them to antitrust law.
II. Barriers to Applying Behavioral Economics in Antitrust Analysis
Although behavioral economics is now part of the economics curriculum
at many universities, it still has not penetrated antitrust jurisprudence in any
meaningful way. Professor Maurice Stucke notes that “[a]lthough behavioral
law and economics has become ‘the hottest area of legal scholarship,’ few
behavioral economics articles relate to, or even discuss, antitrust.”16 This
Part explores why—despite the persuasive work of scholars like Professor
Tor—behavioral economics has not yet been particularly influential in
antitrust analysis.
A. The Allure of the Chicago School: Judges and Economic Theory
In reaching their conclusions that certain alleged behavior is irrational
and therefore must not have occurred as a matter of law, judges generally
rely on simple microeconomic theory as explained by disciples of the
Chicago School.17 Courts are only citing one side of the economic literature.
This is unfortunate because
U.S. courts, as well as many American legal scholars, have had
difficulty recognizing long-term strategic pricing behavior. This is
exhibited by a number of scholars in the antitrust area who insist on
the efficiency of capital markets, resist theories based on long-run
possibilities, and reject the concept of predation. Unfortunately, these
legal scholars have ignored studies of strategic behavior in economic
markets which demonstrate “the learning curve benefits of cumulative
production, the attributes of investment, techniques for raising rivals’

14. Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First
Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 527 (2007); see Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of
Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 145 (1998) (“Cognitive
psychology and experimental economics have found a smorgasbord of cognitive errors, which
collectively falsify most of the axioms of rational choice theory.”).
15. Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 196 (1989) (“Sociologists and other scholars have demonstrated numerous
instances in which corporations violate principles of rationality.” (citing M. DAVID ERMANN &
RICHARD J. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE DEVIANCE (1982))).
16. Stucke, supra note 14, at 515.
17. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 n.17 (1986) (rejecting
predatory pricing as irrational by citing Bork, McGee, and Posner).
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costs, strategic reputation effects, and even international strategic
features.”18
Professor Tor hypothesizes that behavioral economics has not
penetrated antitrust jurisprudence in part because it collides with antitrust
doctrine’s “extensive reliance on the rationality assumption.”19 He notes that
“[t]he extensive use of neoclassical economics has inculcated in the antitrust
community a reliance on simplifying assumptions.”20
One of the
contributions of behavioral economics to economics more broadly is to
demonstrate that these simplifying assumptions are often problematic.
It is hardly surprising that courts rely on the simple version of economic
theory espoused by the Chicago School. Such theory has the primary virtue
of being just that: simple. It is easy to understand and easy to apply.21
Judges do not necessarily understand how markets work. They have no
practice running businesses—either as a monopolist defending its turf or a
member of an antitrust conspiracy trying to keep it stable. Federal Judge
(and former University of Chicago School of Law professor) Diane Wood
has noted: “Economic mumbo-jumbo is already prevalent in the field, but
lawyers talk of the trade-off between the deadweight loss ‘triangle’ and the
income transfer ‘rectangle’ at their peril in front of a judge who does not live
and breathe the field.”22 The Chicago School approach provides an easy
mechanism to dispose of complicated antitrust cases. It starts from the
assumption that firms only engage in rational behavior. It then describes
many antitrust violations as involving behavior that it characterizes as
irrational and instructs judges that the behavior must not have occurred
despite the evidence presented in any given case.23
Behavioral economics is more complicated and more nuanced than
traditional microeconomic theory. Behavioral economics is more difficult to
apply because, as Professor Tor explains, “Different antitrust actors will
manifest different deviations from strict rationality, depending on factors
such as cognitive ability, thinking style, risk-taking propensity, personality
traits, and more.”24 Behavioral economics does not provide easy answers;

18. Steven F. Benz, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42 STAN. L. REV. 695,
719–20 (1990) (quoting Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 298 (1987)).
19. Tor, supra note 3, at 606.
20. Id.
21. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Made (Too) Simple, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming
2014).
22. Diane P. Wood, Speech, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755,
1767 (1997).
23. Leslie, supra note 7, at 265–73.
24. Tor, supra note 3, at 613. See id. at 613–14 (“[P]eople exhibit a particular behavioral
phenomena to different degrees at different times in different contexts.”).
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instead, it provides meaningful insights. Behavioral economics is advanced
economics. Judges who resist mastering basic microeconomic theory are
going to have little enthusiasm for studying and applying the insights of
behavioral economics.
Furthermore, law traditionally lags behind economic theory. The
Chicago School came to dominate antitrust law almost twenty years after it
had taken root as the arguably dominant paradigm in the academy.
Behavioral economics will experience a similar lag. This lag will be
affected, in part, by the resistance to behavioral economics in some academic
circles, which is discussed next.
B. The Critique of Behavioral Antitrust
Another barrier exists to behavioral economics becoming part of the
conventional wisdom of antitrust analysis: some scholars associated with the
Chicago School have criticized behavioral economics as flawed and
inapplicable to antitrust jurisprudence.25 Their two primary arguments are
that behavioral economics is not a predictive model because biases are not
systematic and that markets punish irrational behavior, which reduces the
need for antitrust enforcement.
1. Behavioral Economics Is Not Predictive.—Skeptics of behavioral
economics have criticized the theory as being insufficiently predictive. Some
commentators, such as Professor Joshua Wright, now a commissioner on the
Federal Trade Commission, have argued that the value of models is based on
their predictive power.26 Critics have argued that behavioral economics fails
this predictive criterion because “behavioral research presents too many
conflicting and overlapping biases to make confident overall predictions

25. Professor Tor does a good job of staking out a moderate middle ground. He acknowledges
the criticism of behavioral antitrust and notes that behavioral antitrust does not provide a wholesale
alternative to traditional microeconomic analysis. Tor, supra note 3, at 581 (“[T]he behavioral
approach already offers valuable antitrust lessons but cannot and should not altogether replace
traditional antitrust law and economics.”). Instead, behavioral antitrust highlights examples where
the traditional microeconomic explanation of business behavior may not be accurate and, thus,
should not be relied upon uncritically for either formulating antitrust policy or deciding a specific
piece of antitrust litigation. Id.
26. Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 1527 (2012) (“Economic methodology has long
required that competing models succeed or fail based on their predictive power.”); see Cass R.
Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 9 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000)
(discussing whether behavioral economics is ‘too ad hoc and unruly to generate predictions in the
legal context’); see also Amanda P. Reeves, Behavioral Antitrust: Unanswered Questions on the
Horizon, ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2010, at 1, 4 (asking whether behavioral antirust is “viable in
the absence of an organizing principle”), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/antitrust_source/Jun10_Reeves6_24f.authcheckdam.pdf.
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about consumer perceptions.”27 They contend that, in general, “[b]ehavioral
economic analysis of law cannot serve as the basis for broad normative
policy conclusions because it cannot provide a coherent alternative model of
human behavior capable of generating testable predictions and policy
conclusions in a wide range of areas.”28 Commissioner Wright has applied
this line of argumentation to antitrust, suggesting that behavioral economics
cannot be applied in antitrust cases because of its lack of predictive power.29
A related issue is counterbalancing biases. Some scholars assert that the
biases explained by behavioral economics should cancel each other out and,
thus, these biases are not particularly important in the aggregate.30
There are at least two responses to the argument that behavioral
economics is not useful because errors are not systematic and thus behavioral
economics cannot predict deviations from rationality. First, scholars have
demonstrated that some errors may be systematic.31 Some behavioral

27. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1427 (1999).
28. Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1765, 1777 (1998).
29. Wright & Stone, supra note 26, at 1528 (“Any successful application of behavioral
economics to antitrust law must therefore rise or fall on its ability to predictably and accurately
discern anticompetitive conduct from procompetitive conduct in a manner that can be confidently
and consistently applied by judges and regulators.”).
30. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 261 (2001) (“The real significance of
randomness in rational-choice economics is further explaining why that economics can
accommodate a good deal of irrational behavior without a fatal loss of predictive power. Most
questions that economists ask concern aggregate rather than individual behavior . . . .”); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1035 n.54
(2000). Bainbridge notes:
It is the systematic nature of these biases that is critical. Standard economic analysis
recognizes that individual decisionmakers may depart from rationality, but assumes
that such departures come out in the wash—they cancel each other out so that the
average or equilibrium behavior of large groups will be consistent with rational choice.
By asserting that decisionmakers exhibit systematic biases, behavioral economics
denies that claim.
Id. (citation omitted)). Similarly Arlen recognizes:
Law and economics scholars do not claim that this rational choice model perfectly
captures all human behavior. But they do claim that deviations from rational choice
generally are not systematic, and thus generally will cancel each other out. For
example, law and economics scholars argue that even if people do not accurately
estimate the risk that they will be injured, some people will overestimate the risk while
others will underestimate it, producing only “noise” and not a systematic bias.
Arlen, supra note 28, at 1766.
31. Arlen, supra note 28, at 1766 (“Behavioral economic analysis of law scholars argue that
people do not behave consistently with rational choice theory, and, moreover, that the deviations
from rational behavior are systematic, not random.”); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power
Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 548–49 (1985); Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T
Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1725 (2003)
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economists argue that seemingly irrational behavior is neither random nor
unpredictable and instead this “behavior is systematic and can be modeled.”32
They see the purpose of incorporating behavioral economics insights into
legal analysis “is to offer better predictions and prescriptions about law based
on improved accounts of how people actually behave.”33 So, while scholars
within the traditional law and economics movement “claim that deviations
from rational choice generally are not systematic, and thus generally will
cancel each other out,”34 some scholars associated with the behavioral law
and economics movement argue that individual rationality does not
necessarily balance out and that biases are in fact systematic.35 Professor Tor
notes his concerns about the predictability of deviations.36 I will not enter the
fray on this argument here because, as explained next, this debate does not
determine the utility of behavioral economics in antitrust analysis.
Second, for the purposes of using behavioral economics in antitrust
analysis, the issue of predictability is something of a red herring. A theory
does not have to be predictive in order to be useful. A theory can be simply
explanatory and help us understand why observed conduct has taken place.

(“[E]vidence that many of these heuristics and biases are systematic rather than random is
overwhelming.”).
32. Jolls et al., supra note 11, at 1475.
33. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1653, 1654 (1998); see also RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 5 (1992) (“[M]any of the departures from rational choice that have
been observed are systematic—the errors tend to be in the same direction. If most individuals tend
to err in the same direction, then a theory which assumes that they are rational also makes mistakes
in predicting their behavior.”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to
Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 739 (2000) (“Recently, legal
scholars have become interested in new theories of human decision making that researchers in
psychology and empirical economics are developing. These new theories promise to predict
people’s reactions to law more accurately than either law and economics or traditional legal
scholarship.” (footnote omitted)).
34. Arlen, supra note 28, at 1766 (“For example, law and economics scholars argue that even if
people do not accurately estimate the risk that they will be injured, some people will overestimate
the risk while others will underestimate it, producing only ‘noise’ and not a systematic bias.”); see
also POSNER, supra note 30, at 261 (“Most questions that economists ask concern aggregate rather
than individual behavior, for example the effect on the quantity purchased of cigarettes of an
increase in the cigarette excise tax, not the effect of the tax increase on Mr. Cigarette Smoker A or
Ms. Cigarette Smoker B.”).
35. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 6, at 1057 n.19 (“As we show below, the experimental
evidence establishes that the deviations are, indeed, systematic and not randomly distributed around
a (rational actor) mean.”); Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in
Competitive Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1071, 1081 (1985) (“The notion that individual
irrationalities will disappear in the aggregate must be rejected.”).
36. Tor, supra note 3, at 614 (“Indeed, those robust, systematic, and predictable deviations from
rationality that are documented at the population level do not reflect individual-level uniformity but
rather are the aggregation of significant individual-level heterogeneity in judgment and decision
behavior.”).
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For many types of observed antitrust violations, simple microeconomics is
neither predictive nor explanatory. For example, basic microeconomic
theory cannot explain why a firm charges a price below its costs.37 Instead of
predicting or explaining this behavior, judges following the traditional law
and economics approach simply deny its existence despite all the evidence to
the contrary.
A behavioral economics approach acknowledges that
deviations from rationality sometimes occur and it’s important to understand
why in order to interpret the evidence in a specific case. For example, one
does not have to have a predictive model in order to appreciate the fact that
some firms may engage in exclusionary conduct because they are
overconfident that their investment in predation will be recouped later.
Similarly, the issue of whether cognitive biases are systematic or
counterbalancing does not answer the question of whether incorporating
behavioral economics insights will improve antitrust analysis. While the
academic debate over whether observed irrational behavior balances out is
fascinating, it is ultimately irrelevant to antitrust litigation. Theory deals in
aggregates; litigation deals with individual episodes of anticompetitive
behavior. For example, if one overconfident defendant overestimates the
probability that predatory pricing will be net profitable and therefore pursues
a predation strategy that drives its competitors from the market (in a manner
that inflicts antitrust injury)38 and the monopolist charges a supracompetitive
price but ultimately fails to recoup all of its losses through subsequent
monopoly pricing, it is no defense that another firm may underestimate the
expected value of predatory pricing and forego such conduct.
2. The Market Punishes Irrational Conduct.—Another critique of
behavioral economics is that its insights do not justify stronger antitrust
enforcement because markets will correct themselves. Any discussion about
the reasons why some firms behave irrationally invites the question of how
this can persist in a competitive market. Basic microeconomics theory
argues that the most efficient firms will drive inefficient or irrational firms
from the market.39 The thrust of this argument is that—even if behavioral
37. See Christopher R. Leslie, Revisiting the Revisionist History of Standard Oil, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 573 (2012).
38. See Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695
(2013).
39. Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and Phenomenology,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1715 (1998) (“Neoclassical economists believe that the competitive market
will induce optimal behavior among firms by shaping those that are adaptable, and eliminating
those that are not.”); Russell & Thaler, supra note 35, at 1071 (“[T]he knee-jerk reaction of some
economists that competition will render irrationality irrelevant is apt only in very special cases,
probably rarely observed in the real world.”); Stucke, supra note 14, at 515 (“Even some of the
behavioral economics literature assumes that the rational choice theories may be better suited to
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economics is correct and that firms do not behave rationally—antitrust
remedies are still unnecessary because the market can punish irrational
anticompetitive conduct better than antitrust.
While it is true that inefficient firms sometimes exit the market by
declaring bankruptcy, by being acquired by a more efficient firm, or by
shifting productive capacity into another product line, most firms that make
bad—apparently irrational—decisions continue in business.40
One
explanation might be that market discipline is not immediate and even
irrational firms can adjust their strategies. Professors Korobkin and Ulen
argue that “if it were true that competition drives imperfectly rational
behavior out of business markets, such results would not occur
instantaneously, and at any given moment in time a substantial number of
participants in markets would likely be imperfectly rational actors who have
not yet learned their lessons.”41 Professor Tor explains that “[s]ystematic
deviations from rationality, even when unprofitable, can survive in
noncompetitive markets much like other inefficiencies.”42
Additionally, if the biases described and observed by behavioral
economists are widespread, then the market discipline mechanism would
break down. The argument that inefficient firms will be driven from the
market assumes that the rest of the market is populated by efficient firms
who can discipline the less efficient firms. If such perfectly efficient firms
do not in fact exist and police markets, then inefficient firms can remain in
the market despite their limited information, bounded rationality, and
overconfidence, which may lead them to make suboptimal decisions in some
situations. When these suboptimal decisions also violate antitrust laws, they
should be punished accordingly.43

predict corporate behavior in the marketplace, since irrational companies (i.e., those that do not
maximize profits) presumably are driven out by their rational profit-maximizing competitors.”)
(citations omitted); Jayendu Patel et al., The Rationality Struggle: Illustrations from Financial
Markets, 81 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 232, 232 (1991) (“For most economists it is an
article of faith that financial markets reach rational aggregate outcomes, despite the irrational
behavior of some participants, since sophisticated players stand ready to capitalize on the mistakes
of the naive.”).
40. Russell & Thaler, supra note 35, at 1074 (“‘Markets will eliminate the errors.’ While this
statement is sometimes made, it is not clear by what mechanism markets will eradicate irrational
choices. While it has been argued that evolution will eventually eliminate firms that choose
improperly, there is no such process . . . for individuals. . . . [Q]uasi rationality is rarely fatal.”).
41. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 6, at 1071.
42. Tor, supra note 3, at 630.
43. Joshua Wright argues that even if the critiques from Part Three were incorrect, behavioral
economics is still irrelevant for antitrust law. In particular, he and his co-author claim:
[E]ven if the entire body of knowledge known as “behavioral economics” was
sufficiently robust and empirically demonstrated to satisfy each of the hurdles
identified above, and if we can reliably assume that firms also exhibit predictable
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III. Incorporating Behavioral Economics into Antitrust Analysis
Ultimately these critiques of behavioral economics should not prevent
courts from utilizing the insights of Professor Tor’s article in antitrust
litigation. Many of the arguments against employing behavioral economics
in antitrust analysis are flawed because they fail to recognize the distinction
between adjudicative fact-finding and economic policymaking. Joshua
Wright argues that “[t]he absence of a meaningful basis on which to discern
when specific individuals or firms behave subject to a cognitive bias, as
opposed to rationally, renders behavioral law and economics impossible to
implement in antitrust.”44 While mentioning individuals, he is improperly
focused on the aggregate. His approach is one of an economist, not a
litigator. But the difference between economics and litigation is critical to
properly understand the value of behavioral economics. Richard Posner has
explained: “Economics is concerned with explaining and predicting
tendencies and aggregates rather than the behavior of each individual person;
and in a reasonably large sample, random deviations from normal rational
behavior will cancel out.”45 Posner’s explanation of economics shows how
the Chicago School vision is ill suited for the dynamics of litigation.
Litigation is not about aggregate behavior, but about evaluating the behavior
of individuals, both individual people and individual firms. A focus on
aggregate normalcy is misplaced. Indeed, in many ways the entire litigation
process is designed to address the deviations from normalcy—the man who
robs a bank, the woman who kills her spouse, and the firm that monopolizes
a market. The fact that, on average, people may not engage in deviant
behavior in no way suggests that the legal process should be blind to the
deviations that do occur and punish them when they violate the law.
Policy-making and fact-finding are different processes. The purpose of
litigation is to determine what this particular defendant did and whether the
defendant’s conduct caused a legally cognizable injury. Antitrust judges
need not predict how boundedly rational individuals should perform in a
particular situation. Neither do antitrust plaintiffs: they merely need to show
that this defendant—whether rational, boundedly rational, or irrational—in

biases, and if those biases can somehow be mitigated within regulators, behavioral
economics nonetheless fails to offer any clear policy implications for antitrust law, and
certainly does not systematically support a more interventionist competition policy.
Wright & Stone, supra note 26, at 1526. They are mistaken. Behavioral economics is still
important in antitrust law because it helps to explain that monopolies are more durable and
predatory than microeconomic theory predicts.
44. Id. at 1534; Arlen, supra note 28, at 1788 (“Behavioral economic analysis of law is unlikely
to replace conventional law and economics unless it can formulate a superior model of human
behavior suitable for making normative decisions about optimal legal regimes.”).
45. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 19 (5th ed. 1998).
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fact engaged in anticompetitive conduct, regardless of whether that behavior
conforms to a particular school of academic thought.46 The Judiciary’s
function is not to fit the defendant’s conduct into a larger theoretical
construct. When evaluating the plausibility of antitrust claims, defendants
are neither data points nor opportunities to reject some researcher’s null
hypothesis. Policy requires a theory; fact-finding does not. Even if the
assumption of rationality is appropriate for policymaking, it is not a
replacement for fact-finding in individual lawsuits. Courts assert that they
will not let economic theory trump the facts in a given case.47 Yet, we see
this happen repeatedly.48 Professor Tor correctly notes that “[u]nlike those
scholars who fall prey to the fundamental methodological error, however,
attention to behavioral irregularities should come naturally to courts and
agencies that primarily evaluate specific instances of potentially
anticompetitive behavior.”49 Behavioral economics explains why courts
should look at facts and empirical evidence in a given case instead of relying
on microeconomic assumptions.
IV. Conclusion
The Chicago School of law and economics has been successful in
influencing many areas of law, most notably antitrust law. The Chicago
School introduced more rigorous economic analysis into antitrust decision
making. At its core, the Chicago School posited that antitrust law should be
interpreted so as to maximize allocative efficiency. It also assumed that
businesses behave rationally in pursuit of their sole goal: maximizing profits.
Although market failures were theoretically possible, the Chicago School
argued that such failures were rare and thus did not justify antitrust
interference with the free market. The genius of the Chicago School was its
simplicity: markets operate efficiently; market failures rarely occur; and thus
antitrust is largely unnecessary. The Chicago School has changed the shape
of antitrust law by weakening it. When faced with clear examples of
anticompetitive conduct and anticompetitive injury, courts will often assert
that neither occurred—despite the evidence presented—because Chicago

46. Cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 605–06 (1986) (White,
J., dissenting) (“But the Third Circuit is not required to engage in academic discussions about
predation; it is required to decide whether respondents’ evidence creates a genuine issue of material
fact.”).
47. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 229 (1993)
(“However unlikely that possibility may be as a general matter, when the realities of the market and
the record facts indicate that it has occurred and was likely to have succeeded, theory will not stand
in the way of liability.”).
48. See generally Leslie, supra note 7 (collecting and analyzing cases).
49. Tor, supra note 3, at 659.
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School theory argues that firms do not engage in anticompetitive conduct and
antitrust injury does not occur because markets are self-correcting. The
Chicago School theory is simple and easy to apply, which makes it attractive
to judges trying to dispose of antitrust cases. Unfortunately, the theory is
often wrong. Firms do not always behave “rationally,” as defined by the
Chicago School.
Behavioral economics can shore up many of the deficiencies in the
Chicago School of law and economics. Behavioral economics can explain
many of the deviations from so-called rational behavior that the Chicago
School claims do not happen. Behavioral economics takes the facts as a
given and seeks to explain why observed conduct takes place. In contrast,
the Chicago School often argues against the presented facts when they are
inconsistent with Chicago theory. In battles between facts and theory, facts
should always win. Too often, judges rely on the economic theory espoused
by the Chicago School instead of analyzing the facts before them.
Behavioral economics may make it easier for judges to focus on facts instead
of theory because behavioral economics can explain why Chicago theory is
too sweeping and simplistic in its descriptions of markets and its policy
prescriptions.50
We need to educate judges—and others—about the proper role of
behavioral economics in antitrust jurisprudence. Professor Tor’s excellent
article is an important tool in that process.

50. Elizabeth M. Bailey, Behavioral Economics: Implications for Antitrust Practitioners,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2010, at 2 (“[B]ehavioral economics is not about throwing out the
standard paradigm for how consumers and producers make decisions and replacing it with a
different paradigm. Rather, the likely contribution of behavioral economics to antitrust is to make
improvements in economic outcomes and policy decisions around the edges.”).

